

~~SENSITIVE~~

CIA/SAVA / WIND 69/227



WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

Week Ending 27 December 1969

NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on file.


For the President Only

~~Top Secret~~

SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS


1968 - 1969

weekly average for each month





OCTOBER—DECEMBER 1969



weekly data as reported*





increased from the previous week's 66 to 84 for this week.





decreased from the 242 of last week to a reported 167 this week. The official totals will change as late reports are received and will be lower than the figures released to the press by the GVN for these periods.





stand at three unusual, small-size "QL" groups. One was detected in NVN and the others in Laos. They probably are destined for Laos and are not included as pipeline inputs which total some 17,000 to 22,000 since 23 October.



decreased again from the 500 of last week to 433 this week.



declined from the previous week's 2,007 to this week's 1882.



as measured by percentage of total enemy killed by the SVN decreased from the previous week's 49% of enemy killed to this week's 43%.

*Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Enemy Activity

Enemy initiated incidents during the past week dropped slightly as the enemy basically adhered to his announced Christmas ceasefire. It appears that the comparatively low-level of activity now prevailing will continue at least through 2 January 1970, the end of the enemy's unilaterally declared three-day New Year's ceasefire. Scattered attacks by fire, terrorism, and sapper attacks may be attempted between the ceasefires. Enemy main force units along the border or in base areas remain generally out of contact.

25X1B



South Vietnam Developments

President Thieu apparently intends to maintain pressure on the Lower House in an effort to force it to remove the constitutional immunity of three deputies accused of pro-Communist activities. Adverse public reaction to the recent unruly demonstration in the assembly has caused Thieu to backtrack to the extent of assuring senior members of the Lower House that he strongly supports the sanctity of the assembly, and promising publicly to investigate the incident. Nevertheless, there are indications that if the House fails to act following its discussion of the case on 30 December, primarily Catholic groups from nearby hamlets are planning to converge on Saigon in a further government-inspired effort to exert pressure.

Communist Developments

A major statement by Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap, made in connection with the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the founding of the North Vietnamese Army, suggests that Hanoi's response to the allied Vietnamization program will not be an all-out military effort, but rather an effort to improve the Communist position for a long-term struggle. Giap repeatedly stressed the need for the Communists to preserve and to build up their military and political forces, to safeguard and expand their base areas, and to be prepared to take advantage of any opportunities that may arise in the course of protracted warfare. While not precluding big unit actions and attacks on cities, Giap emphasized guerrilla warfare and the "step-by-step" approach to the war set forth by Hanoi in mid-1968. He seems to imply that, for the moment, biding for time is the proper course to follow.

Party secretary Le Duan was a notable absentee from the public celebrations of three Communist anniversaries held last week in Hanoi. Six of the nine Politburo members participated; two others are abroad. Despite his ranking as the top party official, Le Duan has not played any significant public role since Ho's funeral last September, and his activities have gone virtually unnoticed in the regime's press and radio. In marked contrast, second-ranking party member, Truong Chinh, has been by far the regime's most prominent figure in terms of public exposure and pronouncements. While it is possible Le Duan is preoccupied with behind-the-scenes party work, the evidence suggests that he may not have the power in the post-Ho regime that his official party position would suggest.

In an interview with a Japanese on 24 December, Foreign Minister Trinh reaffirmed North Vietnam's long-standing position on U. S. prisoners of war, asserting that negotiations concerning the "war criminals" can only be conducted after the settlement of larger issues. Trinh's interview and other recent authoritative statements suggest that the Communists intend to maintain their current hard-nosed stance on the prisoner issue.